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Abstract
What is the role of control in maintaining trust in outsourcing relationships? Although the literature is
quite rich on conceptualizing the relationship between control and trust in inter-organizational relationships, there exist quite sparse quantitative works which help to evaluate the models developed. In
this paper, we analyze data from 156 IT outsourcing relationships of German banks in order to get
insights into the actual relationships between different modes of control and the level of relational
trust in these relationships. Additionally, we examine the role of service quality (measured in terms of
reliability and responsiveness) in this context. The results show that trust is positively related with
most modes of control, and that there is indicative evidence that control supports trust in high-service
quality situations while it leads to a reduction of trust in relationships suffering from bad service quality (cycle of trust vs. distrust).
Keywords: Trust, Control, IT Outsourcing, Relationship Management, PLS, Survey

1

MOTIVATION

Although there exists a quite mature strand of research on how to manage an IT outsourcing relationship, only a few works have actually empirically studied the field of relational governance in this context. Among them are both quite early and fundamental works like (Grover et al. 1996; Lee and Kim
1999), which evaluate the role of relationship determinants on outsourcing success, and younger
works, such as (Goles and Chin 2005) which develops a measurement model for relationship quality in
IT outsourcing. Nevertheless, works have seldom trickled down the outsourcing governance determinants to a level on which direct and usable implications for the management of outsourcing relationships can be identified. For example, what are the control mechanisms and items that actually impact
relationship quality dimensions like commitment and trust? By focusing on a particular aspect of this
research strand, this paper wants to contribute both to a deeper and more managerial understanding of
the relationship between control and trust in outsourcing relationships. There is a quite rich literature
on conceptualizing the relationships between control and trust in inter-organizational relationships
(IOR); nevertheless, there is not much quantitative research found that empirically evaluates these
concepts and theories in IOR, in general, and in IT outsourcing relationships, in particular. One of
these works is (Langfield-Smith and Smith 2003) which investigates the impact of control mechanisms from a transaction cost economics perspective by conducting a single case study. Further, the
existing literature that has investigated the interrelationship between control and trust has derived contradicting findings, up to now. While some researchers found control to be positively related with
trust, others suggest negative interrelations (Das and Teng 2001; Langfield-Smith and Smith 2003).
In order to contribute to this important strand of research, we want to answer the following research
question: What is the relationship between trust and different managerial control mechanisms in outsourcing relationships? How does the level of service quality, in terms of reliability and responsiveness, affect this relationship?
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 introduces related work and develops
our research hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the chosen approach and gives an overview about our
sample while section 4 empirically evaluates the proposed hypotheses. Section 5 discusses the results
and derives implications for research and management before section 6 concludes the paper.

2

RESEARCH MODEL

Previous literature has highlighted the shortcomings of solely considering contractual issues for assessing the quality of IT outsourcing arrangements, as those contracts concluded at the beginning of an
outsourcing relationship do not comprise all future eventualities and thus are inherently incomplete
(Hart 1988; Macneil 1980). Consequently, researchers have shed light on the importance of a good
cooperative relationship being another relevant facet of outsourcing management (Klepper 1995; Lacity and Willcocks 1995; McFarlan and Nolan 1995). In a first empirical investigation, Grover et al.
(1996) have addressed this extended view of an outsourcing relationship by factors like trust and
commitment which reduce threats from opportunistic behavior, help to better integrate partners and to
reduce formal contracting. Other authors suggested incorporating additional aspects or dimensions
aiming at a better and more comprehensive understanding of outsourcing relationship quality. For a
good overview and summary on this as well as an empirical validation, see (Goles and Chin 2005).
Although it is difficult to capture and to measure, inter-firm trust has shown to be a fundamental dimension of relationship quality (Kanter 1994; Ring and Van de Ven 1994). Trust has been defined as
“the firm´s belief that another company will perform actions that will result in positive outcomes for
the firm, as well as not take unexpected actions that would result in negative outcomes for the firm”
(Anderson and Narus 1990). Since the early 1990s, there have been numerous works which defined
trust as a multi-dimensional concept (Das and Teng 2001). One of the most popular conceptualizations
distinguishes between competence trust and relational trust (Anderson and Narus 1990; Das and Teng

2001) – or “concern a partner’s ability to perform according to agreements (competence trust), or his
intentions to do so (goodwill trust)” (Nooteboom 1996, 990, p. 990). Others have proposed a distinction between the need for trust and the actual level of trust (Gallivan and Depledge 2003). In this work
we focus on the latter one.
The outsourcing literature moreover has shown the importance of trust for maintaining and managing
an ongoing outsourcing relationship and tested its contribution to outsourcing success in numerous
qualitative and quantitative works (Goo and Nam 2007; Grover et al. 1996; Kern 1997; LangfieldSmith and Smith 2003; Sabherwal 1999; Willcocks and Kern 1998). In this study, we investigate the
relationship, and thus trust, between client and vendor from the client´s perspective.
One of the antecedents of low outsourcing risk, high service quality, and success in IT outsourcing is
monitoring the provider (“control”). In general, control is related to comparing as-is and to-be in order
to reach the goals set by the firm through corrective actions, where deviations appear. However, since
esp. in the area of IS, outcomes and corrective actions are not always clear ex ante, a broader view on
control has been discussed (Kirsch 1997; Lee et al. 2008). Osterloh and Weibel (2006) differ between
the control object, the point in time, and the control direction. The control object itself can then be
examined in several ways. First, process control or behavioral control involves controlling process
execution and also monitoring the employees´ behavior (Ouchi and Maguire 1975). Second, result
control or outcome control traditionally is the comparison of as-is and to-be (Das and Teng 2001).
Both behavioral and outcome control represent formal modes of control and thus can be characterized
as a performance evaluation strategy (Eisenhardt 1985). Third, social control adheres to the compliance of codes and values (Ouchi 1979), is known as an informal mode of control, and can e.g. be assessed at different levels like group (clan control) and individual (self control) level (Kirsch 1997).
Control can be conducted in an ongoing manner during an arrangement (feed forward controls) or at
its end (feed-back control). In both cases, directed controls implemented to check for determined behaviors and performance standards, and undirected controls like e.g. early warning systems are possible. In general, the mode of control that is appropriate and therefore should be implemented is dependent on the context and the available information, e.g. it makes sense to implement outcome control
when outcomes are measurable (Kirsch 1997).
In short term, it might be attractive from an outsourcing firm’s point of view to achieve a high level of
control. This helps to identify variations and to initiate retaliatory action as early as possible, thus
avoiding escalations (Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995). When viable controls are agreed upon in the
outsourcing contract, this can have positive effects in a twofold way. While the service receiver can
monitor the quantity and quality of the service, the service provider can substantiate that the delivered
services meet the standards as determined in the contract (Langfield-Smith and Smith 2003). Thus,
control can also be viewed positively from a vendor´s perspective.
However, accounting for elements like trust as described above when intending to build a long-term
relationship, too much of control can result in undesired effects within a work relationship and destroy
trust (Lorange and Roos 1992). The occurrence of such effects does not reflect the original goals of the
controlling party and reasons can be found in an employee’s strive for relative independence. This can
lead to a vicious circle as described by Argyris (1952) in a way that more control causes a decrease of
satisfaction, causes less willingness to perform, causes less efficiency, causes more control, and so on.
This is confirmed by Das and Teng (2001) who argue that formal control will undermine trust since it
takes autonomy and independence away from the controlled partner firm. Considering this, one central
issue for managers of outsourcing relationships would be to choose the right or optimal level of control, both from an organizational point of view (control mechanisms and systems) and a social point of
view. In doing so, the benefits (reduced incentives for opportunistic behavior) and the costs (e.g. reduction of trust level) of control have to be balanced carefully.
Nevertheless, as already outlined, control can also have positive impacts in building and sustaining
trust because specifying performance goals and controlling that they are achieved helps to motivate
people who do their job well (Sitkin 1995) and because control reduces relational risks and thus facili-

tates trust and collaboration (Coletti et al. 2005). More control and certainty can lead to greater satisfaction, better conflict avoiding, cost reduction, and the development of trust in buyer/seller relationships (Marcolin and McLellan 1998). Moreover, Das and Teng propose a positive relationship by reversing the causality: “goodwill trust and competence trust will enhance the effectiveness of all control
modes (behaviour, output, and social) in an alliance” (Das and Teng 2001, 265, p. 265). In their conceptual work on strategic B2B alliances, they argue that result controls will have a negative effect on
trust while social controls lead to a higher level of trust. This is in line with findings that people who
aim at building trustful relationships tend to avoid formal controls (McEvily et al. 2003).
Summarizing the different lines of argumentation, we hypothesize the different modes of control to be
either positively, negatively, or concavely (reverse-U shaped) associated with the level of trust.
H1a: Control will be negatively related with the client´s trust in the vendor.
H1b: Control will be positively related with the client´s trust in the vendor.
H1c: There will be a concave relationship between control and the client´s trust in the vendor.
Furthermore, literature has discussed the existence of cycles of trust and distrust (Ring 1996) or spiralling effects (Marcolin 2002) when considering positive and negative impacts of control. A cycle of
trust does appear if control is used to credit the provider for high performance. Good results from controlling the provider lead to increasing trust. By contrast, if the provider does not deliver high service
quality, the reverse effect will appear: trust is destroyed by the cycle of distrust, since the client firm
increases the control level and may find more deficiencies. Correspondingly, Sabherwal (1999)
showed in a case study that good performance in an outsourcing relationship arises from a balance
between trust and structural control, while the opposite will occur when an inappropriate structure
comes together with a specific type of trust (over or under control).
This high interdependence between trust, control, and service quality as contingency variable leads to
our second hypothesis.
H2: High service quality will lead to a cycle of the client’s trust in the vendor, while low service quality will lead to a cycle of distrust.

3

METHODOLOGY

3.1

Unit of Analysis and Approach

In our study, we surveyed the relationship of the 1,000 largest German banks to their IT service provider who is responsible for providing the primary loans system (i.e. operating and maintaining the IS
used to grant and manage private construction loans and mortgages). The data were collected between
April and October 2008.
In Germany, all banks belong to one of three sectors: while commercial banks are mostly independent
when selecting an IT service provider, public savings banks and cooperatives both have joint IT service firm subsidiaries within their sectors. Moreover, particularly banks that belong to one of the latter
two sectors show very ancient IT outsourcing relationships (cf. Table 1).
Bank type

Population

Sample

Commercial banks
Savings banks
Cooperatives

136 (13.6%)
422 (42.2%)
442 (44.2%)
1,000 (100.0%)

23 (13.6%)
55 (32.5%)
91 (53.9%)
169 (100.0%)

Table 1.

Duration of relationship to IT service provider
0-5
6-10
>10
Don´t
N/A
years
years
years
know
3
6
11
1
2
6
7
37
1
4
3
4
81
0
3
12
17
129
2
9

Distribution of bank types in the overall population and in the sample

All banks have been initially contacted via phone in order to identify the appropriate person (Chief
Information Officer or other IT manager, responsible for managing the relationship to the IT provider)
and to ensure that the relevant IT system is not provided by an in-house unit. If it turned out that the
bank was not engaged in outsourcing, it was dropped from the list of addressees and been replaced by
the next largest one. Only 52 banks out of the initially largest 1,000 stated to have the operations of the
loans system provided in-house. All other managers received the questionnaire (via mail, fax, or email, depending on their preferences). After two reminders (paper-based and call-based) we eventually
received 169 usable questionnaires (response rate = 16.9%).
For testing the basic relationship between trust and control (H1) we will provide both a regression
analysis and a group comparison which allows us for a very simple but robust identification of a
change in the relationship (such as concave relation which turns from an increasing relationship to an
decreasing relationship at a certain degree of control). The second hypothesis is tested by hierarchical
regression-based moderator tests and group comparisons.
3.2

Measurement

All of our constructs were measured by multi-item scales in order to increase reliability. The particularities are explained in the following and the indicators are listed inError! Reference source not
found. Table 7 in the appendix.
Control: To better understand the impact of control, we distinguish two of the three dimensions as
discussed in the literature review above but more strongly dedicate them to the application domain in
order to test for control action items: First, performance reports delivered from the IT service provider
to the bank (CONTROL_REP) represent formal result control mechanisms (output control). Second,
actions conducted by the provider firm itself (CONTROL_PROV) are examined, such as employee
satisfaction surveys on the client side (output control). Third, detailed activity monitoring done by the
client itself (CONTROL_BANK) represent the third dimension (behavioral control).
Trust (TRUST): We focus on the concept of relational trust. This construct was measured by reflective
indicators derived from (Goles and Chin 2005; Kettinger and Lee 1995; Parasuraman et al. 1988).
Service quality: For capturing service quality, SERVQUAL (Parasuraman et al. 1988) has become one
of the most commonly used measurement instruments both in Marketing Sciences but also in
Information Systems (e.g., IS-SERVQUAL (Kettinger and Lee 1994)). From this instrument, we take
reliability (i.e., ability to perform service dependably and accurately; SQ_reliability) (Grover et al.
1996; Lee and Kim 1999) and responsiveness (flexible reaction to problems and changing demands
from client side; SQ_responsiveness). Especially, responsiveness often shows to be a critical facet of
service quality when asking vendor managers.
To be able to conduct group comparisons and hierarchical regression analyses, we applied
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA; principal component analysis, in particular) to achieve construct
scores from the multi-item measures.

4

RESULTS

In this section, the proposed hypotheses are empirically tested, as described above. However, first of
all we evaluate the measurement model in order to ensure reliability and validity of the scales used.
4.1

Validation of the Measurement Models

All of our tests are based on reflectively measured constructs. We deleted all cases which showed a
missing value in any of the items used. This resulted in a reduced sample of 156 data sets.
Measurement instruments have to be analyzed regarding content validity, indicator reliability, and
construct validity. Content validity examines the degree to which the supposed meaning of a construct

is reflected by its measures (Boudreau et al. 2001). Content validity was ensured by developing questions for indicators from preceding research as well as by performing pre-tests to check for ambiguities. The findings from the pre-tests were incorporated into the questionnaire after adaptation or elimination of single questions. For ensuring indicator reliability, loadings should be significant and above
0.7 (Hulland 1999) which is fulfilled by all our indicators (cf. Table 8 in the Appendix).
For ensuring convergent validity as an aspect of construct validity, composite reliability has to be
above .7 (Nunnally 1978) and the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) should be above .5 (Chin 1998).
Table 9 in the Appendix shows that all of our constructs fulfill this requirement. Finally, discriminant
validity represents the extent to which the items of a latent variable differ from items of other latent
variables in the same model (Hulland 1999). As Table 10 in the Appendix shows all inter-correlations
between the latent variables are lower than the square root of the AVE (shown in the shaded cells).
The presence of common method bias was tested both by Harman’s single factor test and by integrating a common method factor into a PLS model consisting of all constructs only being related to their
items and to the common method factor, as suggested by (Podsakoff et al. 2003) and e.g. executed by
(Liang et al. 2007). The largest component of a CFA, capturing all indicators, explained 30.7% of the
overall variance. Since we have only three basic constructs, this is acceptably low. Moreover, the
common method factor did not count for substantial explanations of the theoretical constructs (most
paths in the PLS model even showed to be completely insignificant). Finally, we added two theoretically unrelated marker variables which showed no significant correlation with any indicator used.
4.2

Examining the Relationship between Trust and Control (H1)

We tested hypotheses 1a-c, representing the interrelationship between control and trust within IT
outsourcing arrangements, both by a multivariate regression analysis (TRUST = β1 * CONTROL_REP
+ β2 * CONTROL_BANK + β3 * CONTROL_PROV) and a group comparison approach.

standardized β

Table 2.

CONTROL_REP
.502*

CONTROL _BANK
-.127

CONTROL _PROV
.207*

R2 (R2 adjusted)
.280 (.265)

Regression results (* = significant at p<.01)

While the linear regression test showed a significantly positive relationship between output control (by
reports and provider-initiated control) and trust, and no significant (linear) relationship between
behavioral control and trust (Table 2), we chose a group comparison approach in order to test for a
concave relationship (H1c) or at least a tendency towards it. For each control measure, we ordered the
banks by the respective level of the control measure and split the sample into three groups (with the
split being at the terciles, leading to sub-groups consisting of 52 data sets each). For each of the three
control measures, we compared the level of trust between the three sub-groups specified on the level
of control (Mann-Whitney test). A comparison of the mean values of trust based on the control values
separated into three groups may help to uncover a concave relationship (i.e., moderate controls lead to
a high trust level, while less or (too) much control leads to a lower trust level).

control = CONTROL_REP
control = CONTROL_BANK
control = CONTROL_PROV

Table 3.

Mean value of TRUST
Low conMedium
High
trol group
control
control
(n=52)
group
group
(n=52)
(n=52)
2.01
2.44
2.89
2.21
2.51
2.61
2.29
2.28
2.77

Difference of mean values
Level of sig.
Level of sig.
low control
medium control
group – medium
group - high
control group
control group
.026
.002
.168
.484
.902
.026

Mean values of control dimensions related to level of trust and significance of difference (based on Mann-Whitney test)

As the data in Table 3 show, the mean values in all dimensions and for the overall control construct
(combining all seven control indicators) increase with the level of control. Although not all differences
between the control subgroups in each control dimension are significant, a concave relationship can be
screened out. A more detailed analysis within the control subgroups by again dividing the high-control
group into three equally large sub-groups (again based on the level of control) did not reveal any
additional insights.
Thus, we can partially accept H1b and will discard H1a+c. Moreover, detailed results show that (1) the
more detailed and customer-comprehensible the performance reports generated by the IT service
provider, the higher is the level of trust by the bank; (2) the provider’s activities in conducting
employee satisfaction surveys at the client as well as in providing evidence for IT trainings of its own
employees at least partly increase the level of trust reported by the bank; (3) behavioral control by the
bank is slightly positively but insignificantly related with the level of trust.
4.3

Testing the Role of Service Quality as a Differentiator (H2)

Hypothesis 2 proposes the role of service quality to affect the relationship between control and trust.
The higher the service quality, the more complementary rather than substitutive would the relationship
between control and trust be. Since the described cycle of trust or distrust represents a temporal and
furthermore reciprocal phenomenon, we cannot sufficiently validate it by cross-sectional data. Nevertheless, we tried different approaches in order to get at least indicative evidence for its existence.
First, we did a simple group comparison between outsourcing relationships showing high vs. low service quality. Since we measured service quality along two dimensions, we formed different groups
based on both measures, as well. In order to achieve discriminant validity, we defined the two groups
based on the lowest and highest third, omitting the mid-level third. Following our hypothesis, we
would expect a negative relationship between trust and control in the low-SQ third while a positive
relationship should appear in the high-SQ third. The following table shows the regression results for
trust = β0 + β1 * CONTROL_REP + β2 * CONTROL _PROV + β3 * CONTROL _BANK + residual.

Standardized regression coeff .
CONTROL_REP (β1)
CONTROL _PROV (β2)
CONTROL _BANK (β3)

Table 4.

SQ-reliability
Low level
High level
.616***
.141
.103
.173
-.255*
.019

SQ-responsiveness
Low level
High level
.442***
.429***
.170
.251*
-.157
-.312**

Relationship between control and trust in low vs. high SQ groups (levels of significance: ***: p<.01, **: p<.05, *: p<.1)

The proposed situation appears only in one case (CONTROL_BANK, SQ-reliability). In two other
cases (CONTROL_PROV), at least the impact shows an insignificant trend in the expected direction,
thus being higher in the high-SQ group than in the low-SQ group. However, in half of the
combinations, a reverse result is detected.
Second, we apply a moderator test based on hierarchical regression consisting of the three CONTROL
variables, the two SQ variables, and the six resulting interaction terms. Confirming the hypothesis
would require positive interaction effects. The results are presented in Table 5.
Again, the analysis uncovers some contra-intuitive results: some of the interaction effects are
significantly or insignificantly negative instead of being positive. Moreover, graphical data analyses
showed that at high levels of SQ, the relationship between control and trust becomes actually negative
(not displayed).

Standardized regression coefficients

CONTROL_REP
CONTROL_BANK
CONTROL_PROV
SQ_reliability
SQ_responsiveness
CONTROL_REP * SQ_reliability
CONTROL_BANK * SQ_reliability
CONTROL_PROV * SQ_reliability
CONTROL_REP * SQ_responsiveness
CONTROL_BANK * SQ_responsiveness
CONTROL_PROV * SQ_responsiveness
R2 (R2 adjusted)
F

Table 5.

Model 1
(only
CONTROL)

Model 2
(only SQ)

.502***
-.127
.206***

.279 (.265)
19.628***

Model 3
(all main
effects)

.278***
.353***

.337***
-.166**
.190***
.189**
.296***

.318 (.309)
35.696***

.433 (.414)
22.924***

Model 4
(including
interaction
terms)
.366***
-.214***
.162**
.191**
.230***
-.470***
.158*
.090
.210**
-.032
-.136
.513 (.475)
13.769***

Moderator tests for service quality moderating the impact of control on trust (levels of
significance: ***: p<.01, **: p<.05, *: p<.1)

Finally, we combined the first and the second approach. We did a similar moderator test with a reversed regression function, now using SQ as dependent variable and the interaction of control and trust
as determinant. These regression tests were conducted within the low and the high SQ groups instead
of on the overall sample1. Confirming H2 would be reflected by a complementary relationship (i.e. a
positive interaction effect) in the high-SQ sub-sample, and a substitutive relationship (negative interaction effect) in the low-SQ sub-sample.
Because we found multicollinearity problems during this analysis (VIFs up to 50), we followed the
regression approach proposed by (Lance 1988) and successfully applied in other studies (e.g. (Prabhu
et al. 2005; Tiwana et al. 2007)): we tested the following regression function: SQ = β 0 + β1 *
CONTROL + β2 * TRUST + β3 * dXX + residual with dXX as the regression residual from the
following regression function: CONTROL * TRUST = β0 + β1 * CONTROL + β2 * TRUST + residual.
This approach prevents inflation of the regression coefficients resulting from multicollinearity. We did
this procedure for all combinations of CONTROL = {rep, prov, bank} and SQ = {reliability,
responsiveness} within the low and high service quality sub groups. The following table shows the
results.

Standardized regression coeff. and
sig. level of interaction term
CONTROL_prov * TRUST
CONTROL_rep * TRUST
CONTROL_bank * TRUST
N (sample size)

Table 6.

1

SQ-reliability
Low level
High level

SQ-responsiveness
Low level
High level

-.007, .946
-.242, .019
-.202, .052
76

-.072, .482
-.151, .131
-.180, .073
78

.189, .089
-.143, .190
.082, .734
80

.112, .289
.170, .104
.101, .328
80

Interaction tests for control and trust showing different effects on SQ at different levels of SQ

In order to increase reliability during the regression analyses, we did not choose the terciles with low and with high service
quality as group separators but used the lower and the higher half in order to have larger sub-samples for the regression calculations. Nevertheless, using the terciles does not lead to structural differences in the results displayed by Table 6; path
coefficient differences show to be even larger, but the smaller samples do not enable successful tests of significance.

Interestingly, now a major proportion of the results supports our proposition. Although the path coefficients are mainly insignificant, due to the small data samples, the differences between both groups are
significant in all cases (based on a bootstrapping with 500 samples). Comparing the groups, there is
usually a negative relationship in the group with low SQ, while it is positive or at least less negative in
the high SQ group.

5

DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS

While many of the conceptual and few of the empirical works (Das and Teng 1998; Das and Teng
2001; Grundei 2006; Kale et al. 2000; Langfield-Smith and Smith 2003) argue for a negative relationship between control and trust, our work found mainly a positive relationship. This can at least partially be ascribed to the characteristics of our control items. Particularly, the provider-based control
items, such as employee surveys or proving IT training certificates, are more or less directly reasoned
in promoting a good relationship. Thus, this dimension is very likely to lead to a positive relationship.
Further, the control reports construct was measured in a more qualitative way, which also will contribute to a positive relationship. By contrast, the bank-driven control showed no correlation with the level
of trust in the relationship and rather turned into a negative path when service quality was introduced
as a moderator. A reason that can be directly extracted from the different service quality dimensions is
that bank-driven control does not necessarily drive reliability (that would be the most obvious relation)
but rather the responsiveness by the provider, which usually indicates commitment and in turn significantly drives trust in the relationship. The negative residual direct relationship then can be explained
by reversing the link. Above, we discussed the reciprocal relation between trust and control, which can
be uncovered here. The negative residual path simply indicates the reverse argument that a less trustful
relationship will lead to more control actions by the bank itself. Nevertheless, most of our results quite
strongly and impressively showed that there are no significantly negative relations between control
and trust. This indicates that there is no over-control in our sample and that the finance industry and
their IT providers are used to high levels of control being a natural and “healthy” part of their business.
Interestingly, there is no correlation between bank-driven control and service reliability, and moreover, provider-driven control in both models has a significant positive effect on trust, but is not related
to higher service quality. This again underlines that the primary reasoning may lie in maintaining the
relationship by these issues, rather than actually increasing operational service quality.
Contra-intuitively, the basic tests of service quality moderating the relationship between control and
trust showed to be negative instead of being positive, as proposed. This represents a substitutive relationship between service quality and control regarding the achievement of a trustful relationship. In
case of high service quality, the need and impact of control is less than otherwise. Nevertheless, in
case of high service quality, control, at least as measured by the control action items in this paper, can
even better interact with the creation of trust in order to achieve a successful outsourcing partnership
(cycle of trust, as indicatively confirmed at the end of section 4.3).
This leads to our implications for management: our results clearly showed the positive impact of several control action items, both the provider and the client firm can apply. Providers that set up mechanisms that fulfill social control (such as surveying satisfaction of client employees or proving training
certificates for own personnel) will increase and maintain trust. Nevertheless, the client should be
aware that these measures will eventually turn into an increase in service quality and not only in relationship quality (dazzling effect). Further, the client has to be aware of the cycle of distrust. Good relationship quality which is oriented towards a long-term partnership requires sensitivity and sometimes
forbearance in order to support the provider during difficult situations. Otherwise, control will just
worsen and maybe destroy the outsourcing relationship with high costs on both sides.
Of course, there are a number of limitations that have to be considered when interpreting the results:
(1) we investigated IT outsourcing relationships restricted to the German Banking Industry; (2) our
findings are based on data from only one point in time, and collected from one person in each bank,

thus inhibiting the assessment of time effects (and, the cycle of trust/distrust, in particular) and incorporating subjectivity; (3) we are aware that parts of our measurement model may be subject to being
too tightly bound to the application domain. Although this might be a weakness for rigorously testing
theory on the relationship of trust and control, it will improve the trade-off between the results providing valid findings while being directly applicable by managers who maintain outsourcing relationships. Also, through adopting indictors from prior research and in-depth case studies, we can assume
our measurement model to be appropriate; (4) we have not tested for any contingency factors, yet.
Besides e.g. firm size or strategy, in particular the duration of the relationship could have an impact.
Although we suppose the relationship age not to have an effect in our data since, as shown above,
most arrangements have lasted more than ten years, further investigations will include such tests. Also,
we concentrated on one specific information system to avoid noteworthy contingency effects, which
could e.g. result when different outsourcing scenarios (e.g. characterized by various degrees of complexity) are examined and thus trust is more or less important with respect to distinct scenarios; (5)
trust has only been measured as relational trust, neglecting other dimensions such as competence trust,
in particular.
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CONCLUSION

Based on data of IT outsourcing relationships between 156 German banks and their IT service providers, and on the literature that has dealt with the coherence of control and trust in inter-organizational
collaboration, this paper investigated the relationship between control and trust, and also included
service quality as a moderator. We could show that different types of control do differently affect the
level of trust in IT outsourcing arrangements. While control reports and provider-driven controls
proved to have a positive effect, bank-driven controls did not correlate with trust and furthermore
showed a negative effect when considering the level of service quality. Quite surprisingly, the interaction effects of service quality and control turned out to be negatively related with trust. However,
comparing high-service quality situations with those showing low service quality, we could indicatively validate the hypothesis that there may exist cycles of trust/distrust. Finally, by splitting control
into different dimensions, we did a first step to generating more concrete implications for provider
managers that can help determining the right level of control.
In a next step, we will incorporate different contingency variables and a richer concept of trust, as
noted in the limitations, in order to take the true complexity of outsourcing relationships better into
account. Moreover, we intend to collect periodical data from selected firms in order to get longitudinal
data for more adequately testing the proposed inter-temporal effects. Ultimately, we hope to contribute
both to a better scientific understanding of the complexities between control and trust and to a statistically validated managerial set of control action items which helps outsourcing relationship managers
to achieve and maintain sustainable and successful IT outsourcing partnerships.
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Appendix
Item (measured by either a five-point or a seven-point Likert
Scale ranging from “fully disagree” to “fully agree”)
The granularity of the service reports meets our demands.
The provider’s service reports offer an accurate picture of the
provider’s services.
We can directly access service evaluation measurements to avoid
sugarcoated reports.
We use our own system to obtain detailed information on service
quality.
We regularly conduct service satisfaction surveys among users.
The service provider regularly conducts service satisfaction surveys among our users.
The service provider regularly shows IT training results of their
employees.

References

SQ_reliability1
SQ_reliability2
SQ_reliability3

Problems are resolved reliably.
Applications and services are provided as promised.
There are never any critical system failures.

SQ_responsiveness1
SQ_responsiveness2

The service provider reacts quickly if there are problems.
The service provider shows adequate readiness to respond to our
requests.
Provider staff has a service-oriented attitude.
Both parties in the relationship can be trusted to do business fairly.
We trust that the reports of the service provider are correct.
We trust that the cost estimates of the service provider are correct.
Our service provider acts in our best interests.

(Grover et al.
1996; Kettinger
and Lee 1995;
Lee and Kim
1999;
Parasuraman et
al. 1988)
(Kettinger and
Lee 1995; Parasuraman et al.
1988)
(Goles and Chin
2005; Kettinger
and Lee 1995;
Parasuraman et
al. 1988)

ID
CONTROL_REP1
CONTROL_REP2
CONTROL_BANK1
CONTROL_BANK2
CONTROL_BANK3
CONTROL_PROV1
CONTROL_PROV2

SQ_responsiveness3
TRUST1
TRUST2
TRUST3
TRUST4

Table 7.

Used indicators

Construct
CONTROL_REP
CONTROL_BANK

CONTROL_PROV
SQ_reliability

SQ_responsiveness

TRUST

Table 8.

Development of
own indicators,
derived from
case studies
(Beimborn et al.
2008) and chosen to better
meet the practitioner requirements.

Indicator
CONTROL_REP1
CONTROL_REP2
CONTROL_BANK1
CONTROL_BANK2
CONTROL_BANK3
CONTROL_PROV1
CONTROL_PROV2
SQ_reliability1
SQ_reliability2
SQ_reliability3
SQ_responsiveness1
SQ_responsiveness2
SQ_responsiveness3
TRUST1
TRUST2
TRUST3
TRUST4

Loading from PLS
0.915
0.921
0.829
0.641
0.812
0.636
0.885
0.817
0.763
0.774
0.818
0.782
0.800
0.837
0.814
0.816
0.781

Loading from CFA
0.916
0.916
0.790
0.807
0.749
0.775
0.775
0.807
0.784
0.781
0.823
0.802
0.774
0.841
0.820
0.828
0.765

Indicator loadings from PLS and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (note: all loadings
were significant at a .001 level)

Construct
CONTROL_REP
CONTROL_BANK
CONTROL_PROV
SQ_reliability
SQ_responsiveness
TRUST

Table 9:

CTL_REP
0.918
0.429
0.214
0.383
0.379
0.494

CTL_BANK

CTL_PROV

SQ_REL

SQ_RES

TRUST

0.925
0.383
0.213
0.283
0.188

0.771
0.135
0.139
0.267

0.785
0.594
0.490

0.800
0.524

0.812

Square root of AVE (shaded cells) and correlations of latent variable scores

Construct
CONTROL_REP1
CONTROL_REP2
CONTROL_BANK1
CONTROL_BANK2
CONTROL_BANK3
CONTROL_PROV1
CONTROL_PROV2
SQ_reliability1
SQ_reliability2
SQ_reliability3
SQ_responsiveness1
SQ_responsiveness2
SQ_responsiveness3
TRUST1
TRUST2
TRUST3
TRUST4

Table 11:

AVE
0.843
0.856
0.594
0.617
0.640
0.660

Quality measures for latent variables

Construct
CONTROL_REP
CONTROL_BANK
CONTROL_PROV
SQ_reliability
SQ_responsiveness
TRUST

Table 10:

Composite Reliability
0.915
0.807
0.740
0.828
0.842
0.886

CTL_REP
0.915
0.921
0.465
0.294
0.231
0.085
0.220
0.258
0.313
0.337
0.327
0.311
0.274
0.347
0.406
0.418
0.428

CTL_BANK
0.371
0.416
0.829
0.641
0.812
0.194
0.369
0.120
0.127
0.258
0.197
0.273
0.216
0.131
0.054
0.156
0.264

Correlations of indicator scores

CTL_PROV
0.224
0.170
0.275
0.284
0.344
0.636
0.885
0.142
0.078
0.093
0.070
0.147
0.120
0.197
0.185
0.222
0.260

SQ_REL
0.357
0.346
0.181
0.044
0.199
0.096
0.113
0.817
0.763
0.774
0.517
0.402
0.500
0.358
0.451
0.376
0.399

SQ_RES
0.336
0.359
0.261
0.100
0.228
0.052
0.144
0.621
0.418
0.346
0.818
0.782
0.800
0.469
0.395
0.326
0.499

TRUST
0.441
0.465
0.163
0.030
0.173
0.153
0.246
0.465
0.335
0.345
0.444
0.341
0.464
0.837
0.814
0.816
0.781

